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CoRPORATIONs-lliGHT OF CoRPORATION TO EXERCISE PuRcHAsE OPTION
AFTER D1ssoLUTION-ln 1945 appellant corporatiq_n was dissolved. Under a state
statute, its officers.became trustees, with "full power and authority of [the] company over [its] assets and property," with the duty to settle its affairs for the benefit
of creditors and shareholders. 1 Under another statute, the corporate existence
was, for this limited purpose, extended three years beyond dissolution. 2 Appellant
attempted to purchase land under an option contained in an unexpired lease, but
was resisted by the appellee-optionor. In an action for specific performance of
the option contract, relief was denied. On appeal, held, affirmed. Corporate
existence was continued only to permit settlement of corporate affairs, and the
purchase of additional land would have been either pure speculation or a continuance in business. A dissenting judge urged that an option is an asset; that
the trustees may exercise or otherwise dispose of it as they see fit, in the winding
up of the affairs of the corporation; and that to prevent such exercise would deprive
the corporate creditors of an asset of the corporation. Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, (Tex. 1948) 213 S.W.(2d) 864.
In the United States, in absence of statute, a corporation ceases to exist on
dissolution, but its property, including choses in action, vests in its creditors and
shareholders.3 In many states, however, statutes provide that for the sole purpose
of aiding in the orderly disposition of corporate assets, the corporation shall have
a limited existence after dissolution. 4 Even if existence of the corporation is not
prolonged, its representatives are given power to bring suit on obligations owing
to it, 5 at least if the suit involves matters related to dissolution, and otherwise to
settle its affairs. 6 Title to corporate property, according to most of these statutes,
vests in the directors on dissolution. They are empowered to act as trustees for the
3 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vern. 1945) 1388.
3 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vern. 1945) 1389.
16 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRPs., perm. ed., §§8113, 8134 (1942). Gardiner v. Automatic
Arms Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 275 F. 697. Some courts, however, have held that title to
corporate property remains in the corporation, to be disposed of by charter or law. Screwmen's
Benevolent Assn. v. Monteleone, 168 La. 664, 123 S. 116 (1929).
4 13 AM. Jun., ConPs., §§ 1363 et seq. Such statutes generally apply regardless of the
method of dissolution, though cases of voluntary dissolution may be excepted from their
operation. They may permit the corporation to act only in disposal of its affairs and property,
collection of debts, and payment of obligations. See 97 A.L.R. 477 (1935). Under some
statutes, however, the corporation or its representatives have the broad power to do whatever is necessary for the settlement of its affairs. Illinois Power & Light Co. v. Hurley,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1931) 49 F. (2d) 681; cert. den., 284 U.S. 637, 52 S.Ct. 19 (1931).
0 Bloedom v. Washington Times Co., (App. D.C., 1937) 89 F. (2d) 835; Byrnes
v. Hudson Valley Lbr. Co., 294 N.Y.S. 978 (1937).
6 See 97 A.L.R. 477 (1935) for complete analysis of the statutes in point, as interpreted
by the several state supreme courts.' See also 19 C.J.S., Corps., §1728.
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benefit of shareholders and creditors,7 and to maintain, in the name of the corporation, actions relevant to the corporate assets, presumably including the exercise
of options. Despite the holding in the principal case, therefore, a strong argument
can be made for the opposite result. An option is personal property.8 It may, prior
to its exercise, be sold for the benefit of the optionee's creditors. 9 In the absence
of a provision in the option or a statute to the contrary, an option will survive
not only assignment, but also the death of the optionee. 10 Accordingly, there seems
to be no good reason why an option cannot survive the "death" of a corporate
optionee and be exercised by its trustees under statutes of the type just mentioned,
for the benefit of its creditors and shareholders, just as can leases and other contracts.11 There being nothing in the pertinent Texas statutes to require that the
option be treated differently from any other contract, the dissenting opinion in
the principal case seems to present the sounder view. 12
E. Blythe Stason, Jr.

7 Jackson v. Rothschild, (Mo. 1936) 99 S.W. (2d) 859, a case involving what
appears to be a typical statute, 14 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §5036.
SRingling v. Smith River Development Co., 48 Mont. 467, 138 P. 1098 (1914);
Perpetual Trustee Co. v. Union Trustee Co., 28 N.S.W. St. Rep. 222, 15 B.R.C. 653
(1927).
o 55 AM.. Jun., Vendor and Purchaser, §42.
10 JAMils, OPTION CoNTRACTs 247, 277 (1925).
11 16 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. perm. ed., §8124 (1942).
12 An apparent conflict with the view that a corporation, on dissolution, can exercise
a land purchase option acquired before its dissolution, is found in some cases holding that
where there has been no breach of an executory contract (presumably including option
contracts) before dissolution of the corporate promisee, no action would lie for breach
subsequent to dissolution. See, for example, People v. Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91
N.Y. 174 (1883). But the better view is that executory contracts are not extinguished by
dissolution of the promisee. 16 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP,, perm. ed., §8120 (1942).

